This post is the second in a two-part series. Read Part 1 here.
In a recent post, we highlighted how the Trump administration’s executive orders (EOs) boosting the coal industry will likely not accomplish their hopes for “revival,” as the basic economics of coal generation cannot be modified by executive order, despite Trump’s or Lee Zeldin’s desires. What these policies will achieve, ultimately, is releasing coal-fired power plant operators from any obligation not to harm the communities where they operate.
We argued, based on data analysis of the location of coal-fired generating units, that the executive orders will primarily reinforce historical environmental injustices by giving some of the most polluting power plants in the country a license to continue harming people and places already overburdened by a legacy of pollution. These communities, unsurprisingly, are some of the ones facing the harshest socioeconomic conditions in the country, as well as being burdened with some of the highest levels of exposure to toxic chemicals and other contaminants.
In this post, we take one step forward to explore the intersection of energy burden and electoral politics. Although seemingly random, the goal of this series is to show how these policies, in addition to harming the already vulnerable, will also take their toll on constituencies where the president has strong electoral support, as well as communities facing the highest energy burden.
Which constituencies are being hit the hardest by coal-fired power plants?
Coal energy generation is detrimental for everyone, but especially for communities with high energy burden and historic exposure to pollution. As these communities are often in or adjacent to rural counties, it is unsurprising that many of the communities that will be hardest hit by a regulatory “gift” to the coal generation owners are those that voted heavily for President Trump in 2024.
The following figure shows data for counties where the power plants exempted from mercury emission guidelines in a recent EO are located, and it provides a clear picture of how these variables are correlated. On the vertical axis, we plotted the percentile of energy burden risk, which is a relative measure of how much a household in a given county spends on energy, compared to all the other counties in the country. On the horizontal axis, we plotted the percentage difference for the winning party during the last presidential election. The color of the bubbles reflects the winning party, and the size reflects the margin of victory for the winner.
We can clearly see that the vast majority of counties with coal-fired power plants are strongly Republican (they voted for Trump by a margin of 30 percent or more), which is clear from the tight cluster of bubbles in the upper left quadrant of the plot. The second thing that stands out is that the vast majority of them sit above the 50th percentile in the distribution of energy burden, meaning that they spend more on energy than the remaining 50 percent of the other counties in the country, showing how these two dimensions are strongly correlated.
For example, take Stewart County, TN (labeled in the plot), which is home to the Cumberland Fossil Plant (owned by the Tennessee Valley Authority). This county voted for Trump by a 63.3 percent margin (almost two Republican votes per Democratic vote), and it sits in the 91st percentile on the distribution of energy burden — meaning that county residents dedicate more of their household income to energy expenditures than people in 91 percent of the counties in the U.S.
This is the perverse logic of the EOs aimed at “reviving” the coal industry: Despite being advertised as a win for conservative strongholds, the continued operation of these plants will provide few economic benefits while taking a disproportionate toll on the very same communities that helped Trump get elected.
