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T.S. Eliot was wrong. April is not the “cruellest month.” June is. In slightly over two weeks at the end of June 2024, the United States Supreme Court made mass murder easier, criminalized homelessness, partially decriminalized insurrection, ignored air pollution and climate change by curtailing agency actions, made it more difficult to fine securities and investment frauds, and deregulated political corruption while failing to affirmatively protect women with possibly fatal pregnancies. To this list, add the Court’s July 1, 2024, ruling effectively giving Donald Trump a pathway to an authoritarian presidency by delaying his criminal trials and then, as extralegal protection, effectively immunizing him from the worst of possible crimes. How did we get here? Rena Steinzor's new book, American Apocalypse, makes an important contribution to the literature examining the Right by bringing together several movements that have landed us where we are today.

A government that recognizes that it has an affirmative responsibility to address social and economic harms that threaten the stability of our democracy. An empowered and well-resourced administrative state that helps carry out this responsibility by, among other things, collaborating with affected members of the public, particularly members of structurally marginalized communities, while marshaling its own independent expertise. We believe that these are some of the core principles that should make up a progressive vision of an administrative state.

The summer of 2024 will be remembered for many things, but here at the Center for Progressive Reform, what most struck us was that it was the year that the administrative state broke through into public consciousness. From the unexpected virality of, and backlash against, Project 2025 — a massive right-wing legal manifesto as aggressive as it was arcane — to the Supreme Court regulatory rulings that made headlines for weeks, this year’s political news drove home that the work we do to protect the environment, the workforce, and public health matters very much to we, the people when these things are under attack. In this context, we approach the task of inviting new members to join us in our work with seriousness, but also with much excitement. This spring, we reviewed nearly two dozen exceptional candidates from the fields of law and public policy. Today, we are pleased to announce that we have a cohort of three excellent scholars to add to our ranks.

When I think about what makes the Center for Progressive Reform the “Center for Progressive Reform,” one name comes to mind: Rena Steinzor. This year, Rena is officially retiring from her “day job” as Professor of Law at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, so it is a fitting occasion to reflect on what her “side hustle” at the Center meant for the organization and for me personally.

Last Friday, the D.C. Circuit issued a two-page opinion refusing to stay a regulation. The D.C. Circuit frequently denies stays, but this ruling was notable for three reasons: It allows an important climate change regulation to go into effect; it clarifies an important legal doctrine; and it has a good chance of being upheld on appeal — even though the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a previous regulation on the same subject.

To cushion the shock of abandoning Chevron, the U.S. Supreme Court created a safe harbor for past judicial decisions. This was well-advised. The Court itself applied Chevron at least 70 times, as did thousands of lower court decisions. The key question will be the scope of the grandfather clause.

Regulations that were upheld by the courts during the Chevron era have some protection, but new regulations will be fully subject to Loper Bright rather than Chevron. The general refrain in the Loper opinion is “Skidmore deference.” What does that mean and when does it apply?

One thing about the Loper Bright decision is obvious: it overruled Chevron. So much for past law. What about the future? How should courts review agency regulations now that Chevron is gone? This post tackles a key paragraph in the Loper opinion where the U.S. Supreme Court discusses congressional delegation of authority to agencies. The Court discusses three types of statutes, and it will be crucial for judges in future cases to identify which type is present.

I am appalled by U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts’ opinion in SEC v. Jarkesy because it is so dishonest in its use of precedent. Put aside for the moment whether fraud under the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) statutes is the equivalent of common law fraud, despite the clear differences between the two. The Chief Justice’s description of the law regarding “public” versus “private” rights as a basis for placing enforcement actions in an agency rather than a court is itself a fraud.