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Last Friday, the D.C. Circuit issued a two-page opinion refusing to stay a regulation. The D.C. Circuit frequently denies stays, but this ruling was notable for three reasons: It allows an important climate change regulation to go into effect; it clarifies an important legal doctrine; and it has a good chance of being upheld on appeal — even though the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a previous regulation on the same subject.

To cushion the shock of abandoning Chevron, the U.S. Supreme Court created a safe harbor for past judicial decisions. This was well-advised. The Court itself applied Chevron at least 70 times, as did thousands of lower court decisions. The key question will be the scope of the grandfather clause.

Regulations that were upheld by the courts during the Chevron era have some protection, but new regulations will be fully subject to Loper Bright rather than Chevron. The general refrain in the Loper opinion is “Skidmore deference.” What does that mean and when does it apply?

One thing about the Loper Bright decision is obvious: it overruled Chevron. So much for past law. What about the future? How should courts review agency regulations now that Chevron is gone? This post tackles a key paragraph in the Loper opinion where the U.S. Supreme Court discusses congressional delegation of authority to agencies. The Court discusses three types of statutes, and it will be crucial for judges in future cases to identify which type is present.

I am appalled by U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts’ opinion in SEC v. Jarkesy because it is so dishonest in its use of precedent. Put aside for the moment whether fraud under the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) statutes is the equivalent of common law fraud, despite the clear differences between the two. The Chief Justice’s description of the law regarding “public” versus “private” rights as a basis for placing enforcement actions in an agency rather than a court is itself a fraud.

The Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce means that federal courts will have the final say on what an ambiguous federal statute means. What’s not clear is whether most courts will still listen to expert federal agencies in determining which interpretations make the most sense.

The U.S. administrative state does not merely protect Americans against those threats that we are unable to protect ourselves from on our own. It is essential to a healthy economy, it provides a crucial platform for democratic self-government, and it functions as a great social equalizer. All of this is now at risk after the U.S. Supreme Court’s conservatives issued four separate decisions largely along ideological lines aimed at eviscerating this crucial institution. The administrative state has been built over the course of nearly 250 years, slowly and pragmatically, since the founding; it has taken just three decision days for the Court to undo much of that work.

The American public is lucky to have the federal administrative state. Every day, it protects all of us from harms like heavily polluted air, consistently contaminated drinking water, and dangerous workplaces. It strengthens our democracy. And it ensures a fairer, healthier, and more inclusive economy. The good news is that the self-aggrandizing U.S. Supreme Court decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce does not change that. And that is because it cannot change that.

Earlier this week, the conservative House Republican Study Committee (RSC) issued a memo on how the party’s lawmakers should respond to the U.S. Supreme Court’s pending decisions in a pair of cases called Loper Bright v. Raimondo and Relentless v. Department of Commerce. In these cases, the Court is considering whether to overturn a 40-year-old legal doctrine called Chevron deference, which guides reviewing courts to defer to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of their statutory authority when relevant provisions are unclear.