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When I think about what makes the Center for Progressive Reform the “Center for Progressive Reform,” one name comes to mind: Rena Steinzor. This year, Rena is officially retiring from her “day job” as Professor of Law at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, so it is a fitting occasion to reflect on what her “side hustle” at the Center meant for the organization and for me personally.

To cushion the shock of abandoning Chevron, the U.S. Supreme Court created a safe harbor for past judicial decisions. This was well-advised. The Court itself applied Chevron at least 70 times, as did thousands of lower court decisions. The key question will be the scope of the grandfather clause.

Regulations that were upheld by the courts during the Chevron era have some protection, but new regulations will be fully subject to Loper Bright rather than Chevron. The general refrain in the Loper opinion is “Skidmore deference.” What does that mean and when does it apply?

One thing about the Loper Bright decision is obvious: it overruled Chevron. So much for past law. What about the future? How should courts review agency regulations now that Chevron is gone? This post tackles a key paragraph in the Loper opinion where the U.S. Supreme Court discusses congressional delegation of authority to agencies. The Court discusses three types of statutes, and it will be crucial for judges in future cases to identify which type is present.

I am appalled by U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts’ opinion in SEC v. Jarkesy because it is so dishonest in its use of precedent. Put aside for the moment whether fraud under the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) statutes is the equivalent of common law fraud, despite the clear differences between the two. The Chief Justice’s description of the law regarding “public” versus “private” rights as a basis for placing enforcement actions in an agency rather than a court is itself a fraud.

The Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce means that federal courts will have the final say on what an ambiguous federal statute means. What’s not clear is whether most courts will still listen to expert federal agencies in determining which interpretations make the most sense.

Months ago, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear an “emergency” request to stay EPA’s new rule regulating interstate air pollution. Like most observers, I was puzzled that the Court was bothering with the case before the D.C. Circuit even had a chance to consider the merits of the challenges. Months later, the Court has finally granted the stay, over a strong dissent from Justice Barrett. EPA may be able to fix the problem with this rule very quickly, and the opinion — at least on first reading — doesn’t seem to carry broad implications for other environmental litigation.

Since the passage of landmark legislation like the Inflation Reduction Act and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law during the Biden administration, we’ve repeatedly heard that we’re at a critical junction: There is a need to expand and accelerate environmental, climate, and clean energy policy implementation and opportunities to do so, but the pathway toward this goal will be plagued by significant delays. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) has become a common scapegoat in this fight, with critics charging that the sometimes lengthy and complicated environmental review process NEPA requires is the main thing holding up decarbonization and the clean energy transition. This has led to calls from across the political spectrum for “reforming” the statute. This assumption, however, misrepresents what happens on the ground.

In West Virginia v. EPA, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Obama-era Clean Power Plan. The heart of the ruling was that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had engaged in a power grab, basing an unprecedented expansion of its regulatory authority on an obscure provision of the statute. Conservative groups have claimed since then that virtually every government regulation raises a major question. But the doctrine cannot be read that broadly. In particular, the doctrine does not apply to the emission standards for cars that EPA issued last week. As EPA explains in its prologue to the rule, the car standard is very different from the Clean Power Plan.