This post was originally published by Home of the Brave. Reprinted with permission.
To the extent that people think about the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at all, they likely think of an institution that works to safeguard our health and well-being, and that of our environment. So, The New York Times made quite a splash recently when it reported that the agency had adopted a new policy under which it would stop considering the health benefits of two of the most harmful and pervasive air pollutants: fine particulate matter and ozone.
Protecting the environment is the congressionally established mission of the EPA. The point of this policy shift is to make it easier for the Trump administration to undermine that mission by rolling back existing environmental regulations that are delivering real safeguards for real people. To understand how, it’s useful to dig into some background.
This policy relates to something called a “regulatory impact analysis,” or a “cost-benefit analysis,” as it is more commonly known. When agencies perform these analyses, they are attempting to predict all the rule’s likely future effects—both good (benefits) and bad (costs). In the grand scheme of things, tallying a rule’s costs is relatively easy. For a rule that requires a factory to install a certain kind of pollution control technology, the agency would need to account for the costs of installing and running that technology.
Accounting for environmental rules’ benefits is a lot trickier, though. For an air pollution rule, the EPA would have to translate the resulting emissions reductions that result from the required control technology into actual public health impacts, such as the prevention of premature deaths or asthma attacks—processes generally referred to as “risk assessment” and “risk management.”
Then, the agency must convert those impacts into dollars-and-cents terms: How much money is preventing a premature death or an asthma attack worth? This “monetization” step is highly controversial as a practical and ethical matter, but is defended as necessary for allowing a direct comparison of the rule’s costs and benefits with a common metric.
Indeed, accounting for benefits in monetary terms is so hard that the EPA ends up not doing it for the vast majority of its rules, and this can present a big political hurdle for implementing strong environmental regulations. Rules that lack significant net benefits on paper face strong pushback from conservative lawmakers and the affected business community.
Notably, however, fine particulate matter and ozone are the rare exceptions. Thanks to some groundbreaking epidemiological studies, we have a pretty good handle on how changes in the atmospheric concentrations of those pollutants can impact public health. In addition, the economics profession has made more progress on monetizing these public health impacts than most.
What’s more, both these pollutants are inevitable byproducts of fossil fuel combustion. As a result, any rule that results in the reduction of fossil fuel combustion, even if just incidentally, will generate substantial reductions in fine particulate matter and ozone as a “co-benefit.”
The upshot is that many of the EPA’s existing regulations are supported by cost-benefit analyses with significant net benefits—and it’s all on the strength of the reductions in fine particulate matter and ozone they generate. This is true of regulations aimed at directly reducing fine particulate matter and ozone. It also shows up in the cost-benefit analyses for rules that indirectly generate these reductions, such as those limiting water pollutants from fossil-fueled power plants or clamping down on greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles.
By definition, then, any future regulations that would seek to rescind or substantially weaken existing ones would have cost-benefit analyses with significant net costs. That’s because the cost-benefit analysis ledger would simply be flipped: The “benefits” of those deregulatory rules would be the relatively small foregone compliance costs, while the “costs” would be the significantly large foregone benefits that would have come from the reductions of fine particulate matter and ozone.
The problem for the current Trump administration is that much of its environmental agenda involves rescinding or weakening those regulations. And that would require pushing through several regulatory actions tainted by the political Scarlet Letter of bad cost-benefit analyses. Faced with this conundrum, its response—unsurprisingly—is to cook the books so that the benefits of reducing fine particulate matter and ozone emissions magically disappear. If those benefits are now worth $0 to the agency, then the administration’s deregulatory actions will have net benefits instead of net costs—at least on paper.
Put differently, the long-recognized benefits of reducing fine particulate matter and ozone pollution are like a dam holding back much of the Trump administration’s anti-environmental agenda. Pretending that those benefits are too uncertain to measure, as the Trump administration now claims, is just a lazy way of removing that dam so that its deregulatory tsunami can be unleashed.
Of course, what happens in reality is different from what the Trump EPA lies about on paper. If these deregulatory actions are permitted to stand, they will have catastrophic impacts on the health and well-being of millions of Americans, regardless of what the cost-benefit analysis says.
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James Goodwin | February 2, 2026
To the extent that people think about the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at all, they likely think of an institution that works to safeguard our health and well-being, and that of our environment. So, The New York Times made quite a splash recently when it reported that the agency had adopted a new policy under which it would stop considering the health benefits of two of the most harmful and pervasive air pollutants: fine particulate matter and ozone.
Brian Gumm, Bryan Dunning, Catalina Gonzalez, Federico Holm, James Goodwin, Sophie Loeb, Spencer Green | January 29, 2026
One of the core beliefs of the Center for Progressive Reform is that our collective problems require collective solutions. One of the reasons we embrace the administrative state is that it provides a uniquely powerful institutional forum within our constitutional system of government in which to put that belief into practice — and was indeed created for doing so. That vision has not always lived up to its full potential, of course, and building a government that lives up to that vision is a focal point of the Center’s work. What is currently happening with the violent occupation of Minneapolis and other cities across the United States by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and other militarized civilian administrative agencies represents a categorically different problem, however.
Sophie Loeb | January 28, 2026
Two policy briefs published by the Center in recent months explain that even before the second Trump administration and the 119th Congress launched their broadsides against the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the scale and pacing of decarbonization was already lagging at investor-owned utilities. Most customers in the U.S. are served by investor-owned utilities. Due to their complicated mix of historical industry capture and political power, information asymmetries in the regulatory context, the profit motive of energy production and distribution, and tax policy, IOUs are often disincentivized from advancing an equitable clean energy transition. Our policy briefs explore several alternatives to the IOU model as part of a just transition to clean energy.
Alejandro Camacho | January 27, 2026
The world’s ecosystems have been subject to an increasingly dangerous cocktail of stressors from land and ocean over-development, invasive species, and pollution. But rather than stem the tide of these harms, the Trump administration has resurrected several regulatory changes to the Endangered Species Act designed to stifle species’ protections and provide land developers even more power to destroy invaluable ecosystems.
Daniel Farber | January 26, 2026
At its core, the unitary executive theory (UET) says that the president can fire anyone in the executive branch for any reason or no reason. Although the UET purports to be based on originalism, it has become clear that the U.S. Supreme Court has no interest at all in examining the history. Supreme Court conservatives think complete presidential control is simply the ideal way to run the government. The deep flaws in that theory are now becoming apparent.
Daniel Farber | January 9, 2026
In 2025, President Donald Trump rolled out new initiatives at a dizzying rate. That story, in one form or another, dominated the news. This year, much of the news will again be about Trump, but he will have less control of the narrative. Legal and political responses to Trump will play a greater role, as will economic developments. Trump’s anti-environmental crusade may run into strong headwinds.
Hannah Wiseman, Seth Blumsack | December 15, 2025
As projections of U.S. electricity demand rise sharply, President Donald Trump is looking to coal – historically a dominant force in the U.S. energy economy – as a key part of the solution. In an April 2025 executive order, for instance, Trump used emergency powers to direct the Department of Energy to order the owners of coal-fired power plants that were slated to be shut down to keep the plants running. But there remain limits to the president’s power to slow the declining use of coal in the U.S.
Daniel Farber | December 11, 2025
A recent U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) memo proclaimed the Trump administration’s commitment to “deregulating at an unprecedented scale.” To advance that agenda, the memo tells agencies to put a thumb on the scale in favor of rollbacks. In contrast, most lawyers and economists would say that regulation and deregulation are subject to the same rules. Sometimes, the conventional wisdom is right.
Madison Condon | December 3, 2025
In Free Gifts, Alyssa Battistoni traces the concept of the “externality” across the past century. This history begins in 1920, when the economist Alfred Pigou observed how private market transactions could impose uncompensated harms on third parties, such that the prices of goods failed to reflect their true (social) cost. Fortunately, he argued, these external costs could be rectified by government intervention: adding a tax equal to the social cost, which would cause market trading to “internalize” the harm and produce the optimum amount of the activity in question. Free-market advocates viewed such externalities as a rare exception to the general rule of the wisdom of the market. As Battistoni describes, however, this would change in the coming decades.