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Last Friday, the D.C. Circuit issued a two-page opinion refusing to stay a regulation. The D.C. Circuit frequently denies stays, but this ruling was notable for three reasons: It allows an important climate change regulation to go into effect; it clarifies an important legal doctrine; and it has a good chance of being upheld on appeal — even though the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a previous regulation on the same subject.

To cushion the shock of abandoning Chevron, the U.S. Supreme Court created a safe harbor for past judicial decisions. This was well-advised. The Court itself applied Chevron at least 70 times, as did thousands of lower court decisions. The key question will be the scope of the grandfather clause.

Regulations that were upheld by the courts during the Chevron era have some protection, but new regulations will be fully subject to Loper Bright rather than Chevron. The general refrain in the Loper opinion is “Skidmore deference.” What does that mean and when does it apply?

One thing about the Loper Bright decision is obvious: it overruled Chevron. So much for past law. What about the future? How should courts review agency regulations now that Chevron is gone? This post tackles a key paragraph in the Loper opinion where the U.S. Supreme Court discusses congressional delegation of authority to agencies. The Court discusses three types of statutes, and it will be crucial for judges in future cases to identify which type is present.

Months ago, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear an “emergency” request to stay EPA’s new rule regulating interstate air pollution. Like most observers, I was puzzled that the Court was bothering with the case before the D.C. Circuit even had a chance to consider the merits of the challenges. Months later, the Court has finally granted the stay, over a strong dissent from Justice Barrett. EPA may be able to fix the problem with this rule very quickly, and the opinion — at least on first reading — doesn’t seem to carry broad implications for other environmental litigation.

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed June 24 to hear a case about whether environmental impact statements need to address climate change. To read the arguments made about the case, you’d think that this was a common law area where courts establish the rules. But as I discuss in a forthcoming article, recent amendments have put a lot of flesh on the previously barebones law. The bottom line: The Supreme Court shouldn’t give advocates of narrowing the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) a victory that they were unable to get through the legislative process.

The U.S. Supreme Court is currently considering whether to overrule the Chevron doctrine. Chevron requires courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. We should know by the end of next month whether the current conservative super-majority on the Court will overrule Chevron. In the meantime, it’s illuminating to put the current dispute in the context of the last 80 years of judicial doctrine regarding deference to agencies on issues of law. As this timeline shows, the Supreme Court’s engagement with this issue has been long and complex.

The bad news is that we’re not yet on track to avoid dangerous climate change. But there’s also good news: We’ve taken important steps that will ease further progress. We should resist the allure of easy optimism, given the scale of the challenges. Neither should we wallow in despair. There’s a good basis for hope.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has issued a cluster of new rules designed to limit carbon emissions from power generators. Once upon a time, the presumption would have been that the rules would quietly go into effect, until someday a court rules on their validity. These days, we can expect a lot of action to begin almost right away.