PJM, the regional transmission organization (RTO) responsible for grid operations in all or part of 13 Eastern U.S. states and Washington, DC, just asked the federal Department of Energy (DOE)* to issue an emergency order under the Federal Power Act. In its request, PJM asked to allow for “large loads” (functionally, although not limited to, data centers located in the PJM footprint) to run emergency backup power generation between July 1 and July 2. This is in preparation for the extreme multi-day heatwave that is forecast for the eastern part of the country through the July 4 holiday weekend.
In short, such an order would direct large loads in impacted regions of PJM to disconnect from the grid and switch to “backup” generation — largely a type of diesel generation known as “Tier 2” — on an emergency basis. This means these facilities could run such generators without time restrictions or the environmental protections required by either the federal Environmental Protection Agency or relevant state environmental regulatory agencies.
It is important to keep in mind that while these “backup” facilities are covered by air pollution permits, in certain jurisdictions such as Maryland, they are not covered by a more scrutinous permitting regimen, such as a certificate of public convenience and necessity process that a full-time power plant or other generating station would be subject to. The rationale is that speed is essential in constructing backup generation facilities and bringing them online, as well as the belief that they will be infrequently (or less frequently) used. As discussed below, this is not the way the wind is blowing, and states with such exemptions may wish to reconsider them in the future.
Notably, if approved (likely given DOE’s broad utilization of the Federal Power Act so far in 2026), this is the third time this year “backup” generation will be directed to run on an emergency basis in the PJM Interconnection. Such an order has not been issued before this year and follows a January 2026 policy shift from DOE to utilize backup generation.
Driving much of the reliability gap PJM’s request seeks to address are data centers, with projections for 65 Gigawatts of new demand in PJM, largely from data centers in the next decade. Already, the build-out of these power-hungry facilities led to PJM missing its reliability target (the amount of generation capacity available on the grid to meet projected demand, plus a reserve margin in a given year) for the first time ever this past December.
PJM is contemplating how to deal with this projected load and has been considering a process for non-firm service for large load additions that did not bring capacity with them. In other words, if a data center doesn’t bring its own generation, storage, or other capacity assets to the grid, they would be curtailable prior to emergency procedures going into effect. However, PJM staff recently walked back curtailability, making participation in this “connect-and-manage” framework voluntary.
PJM has not (as of this writing) taken an official position on connect-and-manage (stakeholder voting was occurring on June 30, though it is unclear as to whether the stakeholders will select a position to advance to the board). It appears that the data center industry, in conjunction with the Virginia State Corporation Commission, is keen to take the lead in setting up the framework for such voluntary connect-and-manage practices in the states if such a proposal is adopted. Notably, the industry and the state with the largest concentration of data centers in the world want to keep the use of “backup generation” on the table.
This means that PJM states and their residents are looking at a build-out of hyperscale data centers without a reliable means to power them. Practically, this means emergency orders to run extremely polluting backup generation is, absent intervention, likely to become a norm.
This problem is not just an issue within PJM, either, though the high concentration of data centers in the PJM footprint, especially in Virginia, does make the region a “leader,” so to speak. Both Duke Energy in North Carolina and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (Texas’s grid operator) have received emergency orders for data center backup generation.
Functionally, repeated and more common emergency generation orders that rely on highly polluting backups — coupled with no real plans to increase clean generation capacity or require data centers to build and operate their own renewable generation facilities — will accelerate the deleterious impact of data centers on both local health from increased air pollution and our climate from increased greenhouse gas emissions. This is not a sound way forward, and RTOs, utilities, federal agencies, and data centers must change course and do better.
* Note: PJM initially posted the request letter to DOE, dated June 27, 2026, on its website. It has, at the time of this post’s publication, taken that letter down, though the emergency request is still present on PJM’s emergency procedures page. As of publication time, DOE has not issued the order.
